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Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) Five Years On: 
The Commodification of an Idea 
 
A Response by Kenneth Bush to Mark Hoffman,  "Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment 
Methodology: Evolving Art Form or Practical Dead End?" for publication in The Berghof 
Handbook for Conflict Transformation (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive 
Conflict Management, 2001). 
 
 
 
Hoffman's chapter for the Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation offers a timely 
opportunity to examine the idea and set of practices in an evolving area of activity sometimes 
labeled Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment or "PCIA."   More broadly, the chapter  
presents an opportunity to enter into a critical discussion of the practice and politics of 
peacebuilding -- a discussion that has been conspicuous by its absence despite the rush of 
international donors into self-described peacebuilding projects, programmes, and 
"operations."   
 
The structure and content of the Hoffman paper is straightforward.  It consists of a general 
discussion of  traditional donor evaluation, followed by brief overviews of the methodologies 
employed in:  A Measure of Peace; the INTRAC study; and the ARIA project.  It concludes 
with a one-page conclusion containing four relatively technocratic points to bear in mind in 
the subsequent development of PCIA.   
 
While the Hoffman paper does a fine job summarizing some of the methodological details of 
a number of studies, I cannot help but be struck by the question: where are the politics?  
PCIA, in its origins and implications, is fundamentally political.  To treat it in a non-political, 
technocratic, manner is as dangerous as treating arms control mechanisms in a non-political, 
technical manner.  A full examination of the evolutionary path of PCIA, as an idea or as an 
evolving methodology, must be placed in the very political context of the "Development 
Industry."  Once this is done, then analysis turns towards issues of power and control, and the 
question of whether the empowering potential of PCIA can be realized through developmental 
structures which have been known to have net dis-empowering, anti-peacebuilding, impacts.
1
 
 
While my comments below address some of the specific methodological issues raised in the 
Hoffman paper, it employs a broader analytical focus in order to consider a larger set of 
political issues inherent in the ways the Development Industry, as it is currently construed, 
conditions -- and often neutralizes the transformative potential of -- new ideas whether this is 
gender, the environment or peace and conflict issues.   It will become clear that I consider 
methodological issues to be the least important dimension of the development of PCIA when 
compared to the homogenizing impact of the Development Industry. 
 
The Origin of PCIA 
 
It is worth reviewing the origins of "PCIA", in order to provide a point of reference for 
examining the process by which ideas are introduced, appropriated, adapted, and often 
adulterated by mainstream development (read "political") institutions.  Such a historical 
glance also responds to the Hoffman paper's (valid) observation that my  Working Paper, A 
Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment of Development Projects in War 
Zones (Bush 1998) is, in some areas, lacking in specificity. 
                                                      
1
   Two examples discussed at greater length elsewhere are the international response to Kosovo and the hundreds of 
international donor sponsored conflict resolution workshops (so-called) in the Republika Srpska of Bosnia Herzegovina.  See 
Bush (2001, forthcoming). "The Commodification, Compartmentalization, and Militarization of Peacebuilding," in Andy Knight 
and Tom Keeting, eds.,  Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict Societies (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press). 
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In 1996, CIDA asked me to, among other things, develop a discussion paper for the OECD 
DAC Working Group on Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation on what I labeled 
Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment of development projects in war zones.  The Evaluation 
Unit of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) pushed the idea to the next 
step of development by supporting me to undertake field work on PCIA in Mozambique, 
Uganda, and South Africa in 1997.  A Measure of Peace was the result of over a hundred 
interviews and meandering conversations in the field -- conversations often undertaken within 
a thin cocoon of candle light, ears cocked for untoward sounds outside barred windows.   
 
While A Measure of  Peace employs the painfully honed language of an un-recovered 
academic, any utility (or legitimacy) that it might possess derives directly from the 
experiences and insights offered by those development and humanitarian workers on the front 
lines of  contemporary dirty wars. The objective of the study was to sketch out the conceptual 
parameters of PCIA.  After this first step, the intention was to create the space for those in the 
South to re-engage the idea so that they themselves could develop appropriate, practical, and 
more user-friendly tools
2
 to monitor and assess the broader peace and conflict impact of their 
projects.  A Measure of Peace was never intended to be a full blown kit bag of PCIA tools.  It 
was an invitation into an open-ended and on-going conversation.  Up to that point in time, 
there had not be the recul necessary to hear (let alone listen to) the voices in the field -- 
especially non-English ones outside the footprint of the international development industry.  
At best, there was the usual ventriloquism or tokenism, followed by ad hominem appeals for 
considering the conflict context in development programming.   
 
After the publication of A Measure of Peace something interesting happened.  Instead of 
returning to the field, the idea of PCIA was seized upon by bilateral and multilateral donors.  
Emphasis shifted from the original organic Southern-led learning process to a mechanistic 
Northern-led quest for mainstreamable products ("tools," frameworks, manuals, indicators -- 
especially indicators -- etcetera).  In some cases, Northern-based NGOs saw this as an 
opportunity to bag some quick funding by starting up PCIA or PCIA-like ("or PCIA-lite") 
projects -- projects which were funded despite their conceptual incoherence or the 
questionable capacity of the implementing organization. 
 
The ultimate result in most cases was the limitation, rather than its expansion, of PCIA as it 
was forced into the constrained pre-existing bureaucratic structures and standard operating 
procedures of the Development Industry.   
 
Indicators 
 
The Hoffman paper takes particular issue with the fact that A Measure of Peace lacks a hard 
set of indicators to measure peace and conflict impact.  Further, it calls for a "convincing case 
for alternative approaches is the articulation of useable criteria and indicators."   
 
This is a common criticism of A Measure of Peace. However, a close reading of it provides a 
response:  
 
If the PCIA is to be user-driven and relevant, then ”users” should choose their 
own indicators - whether they are evaluators for multilateral organizations, or 
                                                      
2
   In the interim, a fascinating simulation exercise was developed and tested  at IDRC with the help of , Rob Opp a 
research officer in the Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Unit at the time.  The exercise assembled a wide mix of 
policy makers, development and humanitarian NGO workers from the North and South, and researchers which  
helped to refine our understanding of the PCIA respective needs of each of these  groups as well as some of the 
modalities to be considered in PCIA development and implementation.  In January 2001, this was tested again in 
Sri Lanka under the auspices of the in the Swedish Mission in Colombo. 
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local partners, or the communities within which projects are undertaken. This 
goes against the grain of most conventional approaches to evaluation, which 
typically specify indicators in advance.  However, conventional evaluations 
focus more clearly on a project or programme in a certain sector.  Ostensibly, 
this approach has the advantage of allowing for greater comparability between 
projects by identifying and standardizing suitable indicators within projects.  
There is a danger however, that the a priori identification of indicators may 
obscure as much as it reveals by highlighting (and thus legitimating) some 
features of a project, while simultaneously burying (and thus delegitimating) 
others. 
 
In essence, A Measure of Peace calls for a "kaleidoscopic" set of indicators that can 
accommodate the different needs, interests, and worldviews of the different project 
stakeholders (in the broadest sense) and participants in an assessment process.
3
  This is 
essential if PCIA is to stand a chance of having an empowering impact on communities 
affected by outside interventions.  That you might have different -- even incommensurable -- 
indicators within the same monitoring/ evaluation system certainly goes against the logframe 
logic that the Hoffman paper rightly criticizes.  The willingness to accept such 
methodological messiness highlights the paradigmatic difference between, on the one hand 
standard evaluation tools which create, and then capture, a single reality, and on the other 
hand, PCIA as an approach that interprets multiple realities.  
 
 The use of competing indicators is founded upon the understanding that there is not a single 
socio-political reality or impact, but a multiplicity of realities and impacts that co-exist and 
often clash.  The choice of different indicators by different "stakeholders" allows for a clearer 
examination and understanding of these multiple, overlapping realities.  Is this a problem for 
traditional evaluation approaches?  It certainly is.  However, it is also a major problem with 
traditional evaluation, because the a priori identification such indicators almost always says 
more about the evaluation system that it does about the impact of a project -- and, 
hegemonically imposes the world view and implicit interests of the evaluator's system over 
those on the ground.  Is it possible to come up with a genuinely common set of indicators 
acceptable to all stakeholders?  Maybe, but I suspect that the compromises involved in such 
an exercise might result in an erroneous, or at least one dimensional, slice of impact-reality. 
 
The suggestion in the Hoffman paper that PCIA be developed further through a "project 
similar to the SPHERE project  in the humanitarian field " elicits reservations similar to those 
applied to indicators.  I am worried about large-scale proselytizing missions that descend on 
capital cities in war-affected countries around the world to hold workshops run by non-
country experts with huge frequent flier accounts.  I recall briefing an apostle of the Do No 
Harm Project on the ABCs of inter-group and intra-group politics in Sri Lanka only days 
before his "mission" and workshop there.  This leads me a position which allows for multiple 
efforts at multiple levels with variable (if any) linkages between them in the initial stages of 
PCIA development. 
 
A final note on indicators:  The Hoffman paper suggests that they might be "articulated on the 
basis of the theories that lie behind particular types of interventions as well as from 
experience and case studies."  In my experience, I have found that "interventions" at an 
international level are driven primarily by interests, rather than by theories.  In some cases, 
"theories" have become useful screens for underlying political economic motivations for 
interventions.  While I believe that some interventions are justified, any attempt to assess 
them would be better served by looking at interests, rather than at theories. 
                                                      
3
  Here, it is worth noting that on-site-generated indicators are already being used by the IUCN (International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature) in evaluations of environmental impact. See: IUCN International Assessment Team, Assessing Progress 
Towards Sustainability: Approaches, Methods, Tools, Progress,@ Strategies for Sustainability Programme, March 1996. 
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Linkages and Interconnections Between Different Types and Levels of Evaluations 
  
"But the real limitation is that [the Measure of Peace] framework as it stands 
at the moment is that it provides no basis for looking at the dynamic 
interaction between sectors.  It is not only what is unfolding within a 
particular PCI area but what are the implications of the interaction of these 
differing areas.  How does ‘social empowerment’ inter-relate with, re-enforce 
or undermine ‘military and human security’?  How do different areas 
dynamically inter-react? What is the relative weight we should give to each 
sector at any particular juncture." (Hoffman, pp. 16-17) 
 
My sense here, is that it is the case itself -- the thick details and specificities of a case -- that 
will provide the glimpses into the dynamic interaction between these "sectors."  I do not 
believe that this can be specified a priori because it will vary so widely both between and 
within cases.  So too, will it vary over time.  If we understand PCIA to be a set of interpretive 
tools, then its utility will be evident (or not) only in its application.  And it is in the 
application that the nature of interaction will become apparent (static, dynamic, inter-related, 
independent, whatever).  More importantly, a case-driven approach opens the space for going 
beyond the description of interactions, to an examination of how and why these change over 
time -- a prerequisite to any genuine effort to nurture lasting peacebuilding.   Further, I fear 
that efforts to specify the "basis for looking at the interaction" may in fact limit the utility of 
PCIA by inhibiting its interpretive flexibility-- indeed, by doing what "logframes" were 
criticized for earlier in Hoffman paper.  Namely:  
 
Many view [logframes]as being overly restrictive, compelling implementing 
agencies to think ‘in the box’ rather than being innovative and thinking ‘out of 
the box’.  This results from their tendency to re-enforce linear, ‘if-then’ causal 
relationships between inputs, activities and outcomes.  It is this that tends to 
lead to an emphasis on the ‘quantifiable’ when it comes to measurable 
indicators. 
 
 
Comparing Conflict Early Warning Systems and PCIA  
 
The Hoffman paper correctly notes that efforts to develop conflict early warning systems 
(EWS) "have fallen out of favour and into decline."   It continues: "At the conceptual level 
there may even be agreement about what such an approach should try to do in broad terms.  
But, as with early warning, the translation of these worthy aims into a practical, useable tool 
has so far not materialised.  The gap between theory and practice has not been closed."   
 
The comparison with the floundering efforts to establish conflict early warning systems and 
PCIA is a good one.  But not for the reason that the Hoffman paper asserts.  The explanation 
for EWS "falling out of favour" is not to be found in the so-called "gap" between theory and 
practice.  The failure of EWS was not due to technical problems, but to political obstacles.  
Indeed, when a  problem is defined as a technical gap (whether in EWS or PCIA), then the 
logical response is to fill that technical gap with technical polyfilla©. In the case of EWS it 
entailed countless proposals from "entrepreneurial" oganizations seeking to develop (often 
duplicate) more sensitive monitoring mechanisms and systems. Thousands of donor dollars 
were frittered away into extravagant Buick Road Master visions of EWS in the unstated, 
politically naïve, belief that the "right" information and the "right" channels of 
communication would compel early action to early warning.  But Rwanda in 1994, the now-
classic point of reference, clearly illustrates that the inaction of the International Community 
(like the refusal of the US representatives of the UN to label the systematic massacres a 
 7 
"genocide" -- because it would require action under the Genocide Convention
4
) was due 
fundamentally to political failures, not early warning failures.  That this has been so well 
documented, only underscores the bafflement at continued technocratic discussions of "gaps" 
in EWS.   
 
For the record: one of the main findings of Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to 
Rwanda (JEEAR)
5
 was that "[d]etailed intelligence reports were passed to New York [UN] and 
Belgian authorities by the unofficial UNAMIR [United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda] 
intelligence unit documenting the military training of the militias, hidden arms caches, and plans 
for violent action.  Unequivocal warnings reached the UN Secretariat in January regarding a 
planned coup, an assault on the UN forces to drive them out, provocations to resume the civil 
war, and even detailed plans for carrying out genocidal killings in the capital" (JEEAR 1996, 
p.19)  Thus, in the months immediately preceding the genocide (beginning April 1994) there 
was every indication that massive and systematic violence was being planned: extremist rhetoric 
dominated the radio, public rallies, and the Rwandan cocktail circuit; assassinations and 
organized violence were already taking place; weapons flooded into the country;
6
 militias were 
being trained and fed on a diet of extremist hate.  In Rwanda, inaction by the international 
community enabled a civil war and genocide in which an estimated five to eight hundred 
thousand people were killed within a period of three months.  Hundreds of thousands more were 
physically and psychologically scarred for life through maiming, rape and other trauma.  Over 
two million people fled into neighbouring countries and around one million were displaced 
within Rwanda. 
 
So, how is this related to the discussion of PCIA?  Just as Early Warning gets bracketted by 
larger political issues of national interest of the major powers, so does PCIA get 
"compartmentalized" in order to allow donors to continue with foreign policies and trade 
practices which are patently peace-destroying or conflict-creating.   
 
Without the compartmentalization of our Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment, we would 
have to confront the big, and uncomfortable, contradictions (not gaps) between peacebuilding 
rhetoric and standard international practices.  How, for example, can we take seriously the 
peacebuilding rhetoric of the permanent members of the UN Security Council when they are 
also the world's largest arms traffickers?
7
  Or the US in East Timor, when it supported 
training programmes for the Indonesian military forces implicated in the recent atrocities 
(following in the US tradition of the School of the Americas in the United States which 
similarly trained the military and paramilitary arms of human rights abusing regimes 
throughout Latin America)?
8
  Or the US in the Middle East in Fall 2000, when it sat mute as 
the Israeli State used its helicopter gun ships, tanks, and full military force against Palestinian 
children, women and men.  Or the UK, when it's "Ethical Foreign Policy" allows for the sale 
of military equipment to Pakistan (only ten months after it condemned the military regime 
                                                      
4
   The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.  See Diane F. Orentlicher, "Genocide," in 
Roy Gutman and David Rieff (eds.) Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know (New York: WW Norton & Co., 1999), pp 
153-157. 
 
5
   Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda,"Synthesis Report," The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: 
Lessons From the Rwanda Experience (March 1996).  For detailed discussion of information and early warning, see "Study 2: Early 
Warning and Conflict Management," by Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (with Bruce Jones). 
 
6
 Former Warsaw Pact countries appear to have supplied both sides.  Key suppliers include France, South Africa, Egypt, Russia, 
Romania, Bulgaria, as well as the Czechs and Slovaks.  F. Goose, "Arming Genocide in Rwanda," Foreign Affairs (September/ 
October 1994), 86-96. 
7
  A recent study from the International Institute for Strategic Studies reports that the West's three permanent members of the UN 
Security Council (US, UK, France) account for 80% of the World's weapons sales with the US increasing its share of the 
international arms market to almost 50%.  "US Takes Lion's Share of World's Arms Exports," Guardian Weekly, October 26 - 
November 1, 2000, p.7. 
 
8
 "US Trained Butchers of East Timor, The Guardian Weekly, 23-29 September 99, p.2. 
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that overthrew the elected government) and to the Mugabe Regime in Zimbabwe while it is 
embroiled in military adventurism in the Democratic Republic of Congo -- not to mention the 
viscous attacks on internal political opponents and White Farmers?
9
 
 
What are the implications of this discussion for PCIA methodology?  Methodology -- all 
methodologies -- are perforated by politics. Whatever methodological conveniences we hope 
to fashion for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment, must be placed in this political context. 
 
Peacebuilding as Impact: A Justifiable and Necessary Bias 
 
… although Bush notes the need to distinguish between development projects 
that have a peacebuilding potential and those projects that explicitly concerned 
with peacebuilding, his framework is still biased towards the former.  While 
Bush might well argue that much if not all of what he has outlined would be 
relevant to explicit peacebuilding activities, the need to explore whether the 
particularities of such programmes or projects requires a distinctive PCIA 
approach. (Hoffman, p.17) 
 
The Hoffman paper is correct that original study contains this "bias."  The bias derives 
directly from the study's understanding of peacebuilding as an impact or outcome, rather than 
a type of activity.   
 
As discussed in A Measure of Peace, over the last few years, peacebuilding instruments have 
typically focussed on such activities as human rights projects, security sector reform, 
democratic institution strengthening, public sector reform, and more nebulously, "good 
governance" projects.  While these activities may have had positive impacts on the peace and 
conflict environment, there are also cases where they have had negative impacts.  As 
importantly, it is essential that we also consider (even emphasize) the peacebuilding and 
peace-destroying impacts of those development activities that are not conventionally framed 
or analyzed in this context -- for example, activities and initiatives in agriculture, irrigation, 
health, education, and so on.  Not only are such initiatives or instruments far more prevalent 
than "peacebuilding" projects, but they are less likely to be viewed as being as overtly 
"political" and therefore are less likely to encounter political flak.  If we understand  
peacebuilding as an impact, then it is necessary to delineate the "peacebuilding impact" of an 
initiative, from its developmental impact, economic impact, environmental impact, gender 
impact and so on.  When we do so, we see that positive humanitarian or developmental 
impacts are, at times, coincident with positive peacebuilding impact, but disturbingly, 
sometimes they are not. 
 
The Hoffman paper is quite right that the idea of PCIA, as sketched out in A Measure of 
Peace, can and should be applied quite directly to so-called "peacebuilding projects."  The 
first step in assessing the peace and conflict impact of such projects is the refusal to accept 
them at their self-described face value.  When we adopt this critical perspective, and cast a 
glance towards so-called peacebuilding projects, we see that there are (many) instances where 
they have had negative peacebuilding impacts.  This observation, along side the fact that there 
are other "non-peacebuilding" activities which nonetheless have had positive peacebuilding 
impacts, should alone be sufficient to evoke a much more self-critical examination of so-
called peacebuilding projects and programmes.  However, this has not been the case.   
 
How do we know that any self-described peacebuilding instrument/initiative even works, 
aside from anecdotal stories shared over warm beer in generic bars in war-prone regions 
around the world?  An unsettling characteristic of proliferating self-described peacebuilding 
                                                      
9
  "Call for Tighter Arms Control," The Guardian Weekly, 17-23 February 00, p.8. 
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programmes and projects has been the failure to systematically evaluate them -- a situation 
not unique to this particular set of international activities, by any means.  There are many 
reasons for this, but three in particular need to be highlighted in the current context.  One is 
political; the other two are technical.   
 
The political reason is tied directly to the need for Northern donors to be seen by their 
domestic constituencies to be programming in the area of peacebuilding -- a need heightened 
by (1) the public-ness and the scale of post-Cold War massacres of civilians (epitomized in 
the hyper-violence of Rwanda and the Balkans) and (2) the conspicuous failure of Northern 
States to intervene effectively in such dirty militarized violence -- or worse to implicitly fuel 
it through acts of commission and omission.  For this reason, in the mid- and late 1990s, 
Northern donors became quite desperate to be seen to be funding anything that could 
plausibly be construed as peacebuilding in intention.  In such circumstances, the profile of an 
initiative was more important than the potential impact.  Accordingly, we saw the rise of 
high-profile, media-savy, low-impact-on-the-ground, projects like the War-Torn Societies 
Project (WSP) and the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.  In some of 
these projects, a bizarre funding dynamic appeared to set in whereby the very lack of 
substantive impact by the project encouraged some donors to continue funding it, so as not to 
be seen to have been backing a loser -- classic cases of good money following bad.  The 
absence of independent audits and evaluations of these projects, in effect, served the interests 
of both the donor and the recipients.   
 
The technical obstacles to the evaluation of self-described peacebuilding projects are the 
principal subject of the Hoffman paper.  They are two-fold.  The first is simply the absence of 
the appropriate methodological tools and the means to apply them.  The second is the 
application of inappropriate, existing, programming and evaluation tools. Thus, some efforts 
to examine peacebuilding-related programmes, such as governance programmes, using 
conventional evaluation methods have generated rather bizarre indicators -- such as the World 
Bank's use of "length of time it takes to have a telephone line installed" as a governance 
indicator.
10
   
 
Contextualization and Under-contextualization 
 
The Hoffman paper notes correctly that there is a "need to further develop an understanding 
of contexts, conditions and circumstances and how these affect the likelihood of positive 
impacts."  In all places wracked by militarized violence, these are the essential "thick details" 
necessary for effective development and peacebuilding programming.  However, pointing out 
that such contextual understanding is necessary still leaves open the question of how exactly 
this might be done.  The brief answer is: through immediate contact and experience over time.  
Yet problematically, when we examine the situation of donors and international aid agencies 
in the field, we tend to see a rapid turn-over of personnel, and a general lack of prior country-
specific experience.  This poses huge obstacles to the incorporation of context into donor and 
operational decision-making in conflict-prone areas -- let alone policy making in OECD 
Capitals around the world.   
 
When I reflect on what I have seen over the past few years in Sri Lanka (the country with 
which I am most familiar), there appears to be a trend among agencies to hire field staff with 
experience from other conflict zones around the world (the Balkans, the Great Lakes, and so 
on).  These noble souls face the two-fold challenge of first, unlearning what they acquired in 
other "complex humanitarian emergencies" around the world, and second, learning a very 
different reality in Sri Lanka.  Some have succeeded, albeit with considerable effort; others 
have not.  At the risk of appearing trite, it needs to be said:  Sri Lanka is not Bosnia; it is not 
                                                      
10
 See World Bank, Governance and Public Sector Reform -- Institutional and Governance Reviews (IGRs).  
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/igrs.htm 
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Rwanda; it is not Nicaragua.  Sri Lanka is Sri Lanka.  And this is what sets the parameters, the 
possibilities, and the limits on development programming on the island.  This is not to suggest 
that there is not a lot to learn from systematic comparative studies between Sri Lanka and 
other violence-prone countries (comparisons of child soldiers in Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka, 
for example).  But, it is to say that the applicability and utility of such efforts will be 
dependent upon our ability to fit those experiences into the very particular and very specific 
reality of  Sri Lanka, not the other way around.  To do this, requires an acute appreciation of 
the significance of details -- political, economic, historical, biographical, anthropological, 
sociological, cultural, and so on. While the failure to appreciate such details will certainly 
hamper development programming, it should also be emphasized that this "thick 
understanding" is still only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for successful development 
programming.   
 
More generally, there appears to be a "gap" between the country-specific background of 
personnel and the need for specificity and contextual understanding.   The obvious response 
to this short coming is to put a priority on hiring personnel with appropriate country 
experience and training, and perhaps to limit rotation regionally, so that cumulative learning 
can take place at an institutional and personal level.  It also means seeing hiring nationals in 
positions with genuine decision-making authority, instead of using ex pats.  This is not an 
especially novel suggestion, but one which must be made repeatedly.  More problematically 
however, it requires donors to make a long-term commitment to communities and 
governments in War-Torn (or War-Born) societies.  Longevity and commitment has not been 
a characteristic of the Development Industry.  As a colleague of mine asked a UN official as 
he alighted from his blue-flashing monster jeep in Eastern Sri Lanka: "Are you here for good?  
Or are you here as usual?" 
 
The Commodification of Peacebuilding 
 
We are at a critical moment in the evolution of PCIA.  Not however, because of the 
cumulative efforts of different groups to fashion suitable assessment tools, but because of the 
growth of a developmental "sector" or "field" that has come to be known as peacebuilding.  
When I survey this field, I cannot help but notice the rise of a phenomenon I've called the 
commodification of peacebuilding -- initiatives that are mass-produced according to blue 
prints that meet Northern specifications and (short-term) interests, but that appear to be only 
marginally relevant or appropriate for the political, social, and economic realities of war-
prone societies.   In the worst case scenario, this leads to a process in which peacebuilding as 
an idea and as a set of practices is (to be churlishly provocative) simply stuffed into the 
standard operating systems of the standard international actors who do the same old song and 
dance.  When "new monies" are found, or existing monies are reallocated, to support 
"peacebuilding activities," the old wine-new bottle syndrome is as prevalent as the faces at the 
funding trough. And in this process, PCIA has the potential to be used by donors as a 
mechanism of obfuscation (e.g. by compartmentalizing development initiatives from anti-
developmental foreign and trade policy or military practices) or worse domination (e.g., the 
imposition of projects and programmes that are not wanted or endorsed by local 
communities).   The empowering potential of PCIA which is one facet of A Measure of Peace 
will be snuffed out unless such politics are placed front and center of our discussions and 
analysis of methodology.  
 
Can PCIA be "Mainstreamed" Without the Restructuring of the Development Industry? 
 
The idea of mainstreaming is an interesting one.  It highlights the question of the degree to 
which the existing development structures shape the ideas being mainstreamed.  It highlights 
the question of the how the integrity of a new ideas is affected by the mainstreaming which 
includes, as Hoffman notes, straining them through logframe logic.  However, can, for 
example, our mechanistic checklists for the participation of women (which are employed in 
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this form because it is deemed to be standardized and efficient) really assess the impact of a 
project on women -- and gender relations more broadly? 
 
It is becoming increasingly clear that there is a fundamental mismatch  between the planning, 
implementation and evaluation tools at the disposal of international actors in conflict settings 
on the one hand, and the types of challenges they are ostensibly meant to address, on the 
other.
11
 The current focus on so-called "gaps" by many within the academic, policy and 
operational  communities
12
 may inhibit us from critically assessing the structures, processes, 
and standard operating procedures, that  currently define and limit bilateral and multilateral 
developmental, humanitarian  "institutions"/organizations. The logic and rules of the 
conventional humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding "game" often undercut 
peacebuilding impacts/outcomes. The conventional programming logic of efficiency, product-
over-process, linearity,  "results-based management," Northern-control (under the guise of 
monitoring and accountability) are at odds with what is often  required for sustainable, 
effective,  humanitarian/developmental/ peacebuilding initiatives  e.g., approaches which are 
organic, process-oriented, community-controlled, responsive, and non-linear.   If our current 
approaches -- our standard operating procedures -- are at odds with our peacebuilding 
objectives, then we require an new and different approach to our work in conflict-prone 
regions -- an approach which is very different to our standard operating procedures -- an 
approach which may be antithetical to our current methodologies and tools. 
 
SOPs vs DOPs/ Standard Operating Procedure Versus Desired Operating Procedures 
 
It seems that we may require a new and different approach to our work in conflict-prone 
regions -- an approach which is very different to our standard operating procedures.  An 
approach which may be antithetical to our current methodologies and tools. 
 
The starting point for the casting of a new approach/instruments is to subvert/ reverse the 
principles that, so far, have been guiding our work.  This is suggested in the list below: 
 
Principles Guiding Present Approach 
 
Structured 
External Control  
Predictability 
Mechanistic Product-Obsession  
Time Limitedness (Bungee Cord 
Interventions) 
Absence 
Rigid Planning 
Routinization 
 
 
Principles to Guide Future Approaches  
 
Unstructured/ Less Structured 
Local controlled 
Unpredictability 
Organic Process-Orientation 
Open-Endedness 
Sustained Presence  
Responsivity 
Creativity 
We find ourselves at a unique moment in the development of PCIA and the peacebuilding 
discussion more broadly.  On the one hand there are many allies within gatekeeper 
organizations that are committed to genuine peacebuilding impact.  On the other hand, they 
frequently find themselves stymied by rigid and unhelpful bureaucratic structures and internal 
political feuding.  One colleague at the World Bank, explained that his biggest battles in the 
area of post-conflict reconstruction are the daily fights within his organization -- leading him 
                                                      
11
  This is a conclusion drawn from interviews conducted from 1998 to 2000 with: development workers in War-Zones in Sri 
Lanka, Bosnia, and Russia; policy makers in Ottawa, New York, and Geneva; and Northern donors in various fora. 
 
12
 For example, the  Brookings Process in 1999 which focussed specifically "on the gap between humanitarian assistance and 
development cooperation" by convening an action group leading up to high level meeting at the Brookings Institute convened by 
High Commission of Refugees and the President of the World Bank. 
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to describe himself as bureaucratic guerrilla.  Thus, despite the obstacles, there are the 
opportunities to work both within and outside the "peacebuilding establishment."  
